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Recent Cases

I
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
decisions interpreting "trade or commerce" in the context of professional
practices.
The court noted that federal and
state court opinions drew a clear distinction between the business aspects of
professional practice, as opposed to the
actual or non-business aspects. The
United States Supreme Court declared
that setting a county-wide minimum
fee schedule for title examinations constituted a business aspect of law and
was therefore subject to federal antitrust regulations. Conversely, an Illinois state court held that the issue of
attorney malpractice was a non-business aspect of the legal profession and
was thus not subject to regulation under
the Act. The Illinois court exempted
the actual practice of law from the
Act's coverage because, unlike other
commercial service industries, the practice of law was already subject to regulation by governmental bodies and by
its own professional organizations.
Using this same line of reasoning,
the court deduced that the "actual practice of medicine" must likewise include
those aspects of the medical practice
which receive comprehensive training
or which the professions regulate themselves. However, unlike legal and
medical malpractice, the court noted
there were no professional or governmental regulations for service contracts
between hospitals and clinics. Therefore, the court determined that only the
actual practice of medicine, not the
business aspects of the profession, such
as a service contract between a hospital
and a clinic, escaped the Act's jurisdiction.
The court found further support for
its conclusion regarding the meaning
of "trade or commerce" in the FTC
decisions. The court noted that according to the Act, when questions of interpretation arise, courts must consider
the FTC's interpretations of the appropriate antitrust provision. The court
found that the FTC decisions clearly
showed an intent to regulate both the
actual and the business practice ofmediVolume 5 Number 3/Spring 1993

cine, thereby supporting a more expansive coverage of professional organizations than that under the Act.
In response, SMH and Newman further asserted that Congress actually
intended to treat contracts for medical
services differently than ordinary commercial contracts. The court, however,
refused to recognize such a distinction
since the issue concerned the commercial effect of the contract and its impact
on consumers in the community.
PatientsDeceived by Undisclosed
Kickback Scheme
In their second argument, SMH and
Newman stated that even if the arrangement constituted an unfair trade
practice, Gadson failed to show that the
agreement deceived consumers, the
second requirement of the Act. The
court disagreed, finding that the alleged "kickback scheme," where
Newman's Clinic received a fee for
each patient admitted to the SMH program, amounted to deceptive trade practices.
The court found Newman's practices deceptive for two reasons. First,
relying on Illinois case law, the court
stated that SMH and Newman had an
obligation to affirmatively disclose the
kickback arrangement to theirpatients.
The court refused to accept their argument that the $90 fee was not a kickback, but was instead compensation for
medical services rendered by Newman's
doctors. Regardless of whether the $90
amounted to compensation, absent any
evidence from SMH or Newman that
they provided the patients with information about the arrangement, the court
held that the kickback arrangement
deceived health care consumers.
Secondly, the court held that the
arrangement increased costs to health
care consumers as a result of the deceptive practices it encouraged. The court
focused on studies showing that financial incentives, such as kickback arrangements, prompted doctors to artificially exploit the demand for health
care in order to increase revenue. The
court reasoned that exploitation of con-

I

sumers under the SMH/Newman arrangement could occur through unwarranted extended hospitalization and
other unnecessary inpatient treatment.
The court concluded that Gadson's
allegations of deceptive trade practices, which injured medical consumers and other competing health care
providers in the area, were within the
jurisdiction of the Act. Accordingly,
the court denied SMH and Newman's
motion to dismiss and ruled that Gadson
could file suit and attempt to claim
relief against SMH and Newman's
Clinic under the Act. 40,
-
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Federal Medicare Law
Does Not Preempt State
Regulation of HMOs
In Solorzano v. Family Health Plan
Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (Cal.App.
1992), the California Court of Appeals
held that the federal statute and regulations governing the marketing practices of Medicare-qualified health maintenance organizations did not preempt
state unfair business practice and consumer protection statutes.
What a Deal
Ada Solorzano, America Rodriguez,
and Dolores Morales ("Patients") agreed
to assign their federal Medicare and
state Medi-Cal benefits to Family Health
Plan ("FHP"), a health maintenance
organization ("HMO") that conducted
a coordinated care plan for Medicare
beneficiaries. FHP agents assured the
individuals that they could continue to
see their own doctors, who did not
participate in the plan, for a "nominal"
fee. In fact, however, FHP allowed use
of non-participating doctors only in
emergencies. Except in these instances,
the doctors either turned away the patient or billed them in full for the
services.
97

I

Recent Cases

The Patients consequently withdrew from the FHP plan and sued.
They claimed that the HMO's practices violated both California civil
code provisions against deceptive
practices in consumer transactions
and the state business and professional code. The three individuals
sought to enjoin the FHP's allegedly deceptive trade practices. They
further requested general and punitive damages for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response, FHP argued that
the court should dismiss the claims
because federal Medicare statute
and regulations controlled, and
therefore the case belonged in federal, not state court. The trial court
granted FHP's motion to dismiss,
and the Patients appealed.
The Medicare Regime
Medicare, a federal health insurance
program primarily for the aged, pays
most benefits through a traditional feefor-service arrangement. In this arrangement, doctors and hospitals send
bills for services rendered directly to
Medicare. Additionally, HMOs and
other coordinated care plans provide
all services covered by Medicare, and
sometimes more, at little or no added
cost. However, in these programs,
beneficiaries forfeit the right to seek
care from outside doctors and hospitals.
The Health Insurance for the Aged
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq. (the "Medicare Act") governs Medicare. The
section governing the relationship between Medicare and health plans, such
as HMOs, authorizes the Health Care
Financing Administration (the "Administration") to set rules and procedures for enrolling Medicare beneficiaries. The Administration must also
review and approve all promotional
materials used by health plans. Plans
that misrepresent or falsify information provided to any individual are
subject to civil fines.
The federal regulations covering
Medicare and coordinated health plans
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require such plans to provide basic
explanations of benefits, eligibility requirements, non-covered services, and
other information beneficiaries need to
make informed choices. The section of
the regulations that covers marketing
activities specifically prohibits: (1)
unethical practices; (2) activities that
might mislead, confuse, or defraud
potential beneficiaries; (3) use of payments as an inducement to enroll; and
(4) making of promises that materially
alter the marketing material information submitted to the Administration.
Pleafor Preemption
FHP presented two arguments for
the dismissal of the suit. First, it
argued that the Medicare Act and regulations effectively preempted the California Health Care Service Plan Act.
Alternatively, FHP argued that state
court injunctions against certain HMO
marketing practices created potential
conflicts with federal regulations.
Addressing the preemption argument, the court noted that Congress
historically preempted state regulatory
authority in two ways. Congress either
explicitly stated its intent to preempt or
created statutes and regulations so comprehensive and pervasive that it effectively precluded state supplement.
Nowhere in the Medicare Act, the court
stated, did Congress expressly state an
intent to preclude state regulation.
Furthermore, the court concluded that
Congress did not intend to implicitly
preempt state authority over health plan
marketing. Rather, the court found that
the regulations and Act are "neither
particularly extensive nor particularly
detailed," leaving states ample room to
supplement them. The court also noted
that in areas other than health plan
marketing, courts have consistently
rejected the argument that the federal
Medicare regulations are pervasive
enough to preempt state authority.
Even viewing the federal health plan
marketing rules as comprehensive, the
court found that they would not preempt state authority. The court gave
two reasons for this conclusion-one

statutory, the other historical. In the
Medicare Act, the court stated, Congress expressed its intent to minimize
federal intrusion into Medicare administration. The court also noted that
public health regulation historically has
been a state police power.
Next, the court considered the contention that California's regulation of
health plan marketing was invalid because it could potentially conflict with
federal regulation. The court rejected
this argument on two grounds. First,
the court asserted that states may set
tougher penalties or standards of proof
than required by federal law without
precluding federal regulation. Second,
federal law will preempt state law only
if compliance with both state and federal rules is a "physical impossibility"
or when the state law creates an obstacle to the goals of Congress. The
court concluded that neither condition
existed in this case. Instead, the state
and federal regulatory schemes were
found to be "strikingly similar" systems working together to prevent misrepresentations and other unfair practices by Medicare-qualified health plans.
In fact, the court pointed out that the
Administration directed Medicarequalified HMOs to follow state and
local marketing rules.
The court offered one final argument against preemption. It noted that
Congress amended the Medicare statute as recently as 1990. At that time,
Congress was presumably aware that
some states, such as California, regulated HMO marketing practices. However, the 1990 amendments contained
no specific preemption terms. The
court found that because Congress was
silent about preemption of state laws it
knew existed, it did not intend to displace them.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed
the California trial court, holding that
states could regulate Medicare-qualified health plans to protect consumers
without violating either the Medicare
Act or its implementing regulations. o.*o
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